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Introduction

34
In the last decade there has been a gradual increase of Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADASs) 35 (e.g. Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC), Lane-Keep Assist etc.) in vehicles. More recently, there has 36 been a push towards the introduction of higher levels of automation in vehicles with the aim of having 37
Automated Driving (AD) features. The push towards ADAS and AD systems is driven due to their 38 many potential benefits like increased safety leading to reducing the number of accidents (Tingvall, 39 1997; Guériau et al., 2016; Cicchino, 2017) , increased traffic throughput and road efficiency (Le Vine 40 et al., 2016; Talebpour and Mahmassani, 2016) , time and monetary savings on parking (Fagnant and 41 Kockelman, 2015), lower emissions (Fagnant and Kockelman, 2014) , decreasing drivers' workload 42 (Stanton and Young, 1998; Balfe, Sharples and Wilson, 2015) and providing more productive time to 43 drivers (Cairns et al., 2014) . 44
While it is important to provide drivers the opportunity to use ADAS and AD systems (with 45 development in technology), it is equally important to ensure that the drivers actually use the systems 46 in order to ensure the potential benefits from the use of such systems are realized (Lee and See, 2004; 47 Diels and Bos, 2016). Unfortunately, the usage of ADAS features like ACC and Lane Departure 48
Warning has been low (51% of highway driving time (Eichelberger and McCartt, 2014) ). Studies 49 discussing the introduction of new technology in different domains like aviation, rail, automotive, etc. 50 have shown that for the new technology to be accepted and used, effort needs to be made to introduce 51 trust towards the new technology (Molesworth and Koo, 2016) . Molesworth and Koo (2016) 52 discussed that when participants were given a choice between conventionally piloted aircraft and 53 remotely piloted aircraft (new technology), participants chose the former as they trusted it more. 54
In the driving context, design and behaviour of ADAS and AD systems should be communicated to 55 the driver (Stanton, Young and Mccaulder, 1997) and should be more human-like as it would make 56 the driver-automation cooperation more transparent (Bifulco et al., 2013; Casner, Hutchins and 57 Norman, 2016; Wang et al., 2016) , leading to increased trust in the system. One of the challenges 58 with the design of ADAS and AD is that their introduction changes drivers' task from active 59 engagement to passive monitoring (van den Beukel, van der Voort and Eger, 2016). Drivers' driving 60
task is said to have three different levels: 1) strategic 2) tactical and 3) operational (Michon, 1985) . 61 ADAS and AD systems alter these levels of driving tasks and the decision to design automation into 62 any of the three levels is generally a trade-off decision (Johansson and Nilsson, 2016; Khastgir, 63 Sivencrona, Dhadyalla, Billing, et al., 2017) . The trade-off decision determines the level of 64 engagement of the driver in the driving task. The shift from active engagement to passive monitoring 65
introduces new types of potential errors (human errors) in the driving task as the human driver is not 66 suitable for the task of monitoring monotonous systems (Fitts et al., 1951) . 67 1.1. Trust 68 While introduction of automation assumes the removal of human error, in fairness it only shifts the 69 human error from the driver to the designer of the system (Bainbridge, 1983) . The designer of the 70 automation makes assumptions about the best design for automation and distribution of driving tasks 71 between the driver and the automated system. These assumption may or may not match with the 72 drivers' perception of the automated system and task distribution. Muir (1994) has suggested that as 73 the automation capability or reliability increases, trust also increases. However, a mismatch between 74 drivers' perception and expectations about the capability of the automated system, and the designers' 75 assumptions can lead to misuse (due to mistrust), disuse (due to distrust) or abuse of the automated 76 system (Parasuraman and Riley, 1997) . Misuse is a situation when the driver uses the automated 77 systems for tasks it was not designed to perform and is caused due to mistrust, thus making the 78 situation more unsafe than manual driving. Disuse is a situation when the driver doesn't use the 79 system in situations where the automation is suitable to use, due to distrust, thus not benefiting from 80 the system. Thus, in order to ensure appropriate use of the system, it is essential to calibrate drivers' 81 trust to the appropriate level. 82
Trust is one of the most important factors influencing use of automation (Muir, 1987  Trust with the system 101 "Trust in the system" means the drivers' trust in the capabilities of the system and/or in the system's 102
ability to do what it is supposed to do. "Trust with the system" means drivers' awareness or attitude 103 towards the limitations of the systems and their subsequent ability to adapt their use of the system to 104 accommodate for the limitations in order to deliver the expected benefit from the system. Trust with 105
the system implicitly means that the drivers are aware about the true capabilities, and limitations of 106 the system, and are able to adapt their usage to overcome the limitations of the system in real-time. 107
This paradigm of trust is going to be adopted in this paper. 108 1.1.2. Knowledge: a factor influencing trust 109
In order to have appropriate trust, is it important to convey the designer's assumptions about the safe 110 boundaries of the system to the driver. The knowledge of these boundaries provides the ability to have 111 a safe cooperation with the automated system (Beller, Heesen and Vollrath, 2013 failures" with neglegible impact on trust. Good failures are those whose occurrence is predictable, 116 which allows the driver to be prepared to accommodate for it. Predictability of failures of an 117 automated system comes with knowledge about the true capabilities and limitations of the system. 118
For complex systems requiring supervision, it has been argued that there is a need for an abstraction 119 hierarchical representation of knowledge of the functional properties of the system (Rasmussen, 120 1985) . The abstraction hierarchy can potentially be done on two fronts. The first category is a 121 whole/part of the system hierarchy, in which the system is viewed as a number of interacting sub-122 systems working together at different physical levels (Rasmussen, 1985) . The second category 123 suggested in Rasmussen's hierarchical knowledge representation is the abstraction of the functionality 124 (Rasmussen, 1985) . The physical form of the system represents the lowest level of abstraction. 125
Moving up through the levels, physical functions represents the next level, next is generalized 126 functions, abstract functions forms the penultimate level with functional purpose forming the highest 127 level of knowledge abstraction . The higher abstraction levels do not just represent the abstraction of  128  physical form, they provide knowledge about the control laws for the interactions of the functions at  129  the lower levels. Moving up the abstraction levels provides a purpose of the task for the level below,  130 while moving down the levels provides information about how the task will be achieved. 131
When put in a driving context, the lower levels of abstraction represent the operational (as per Michon 132 (1985) ) driving task (means to a desired end goal) while the higher levels of abstraction represent the 133 tactical and strategic driving tasks (defining the desired end goal). As priority is always given to 134 higher levels of abstraction, a driver has to make a trade-off between the end goal (tactical / strategic 135 goals) and means to achieve it (operational goals), to ensure the means to achieve the goal (lower 136 levels of abstraction) lie within the safe boundaries of the system. In a manual driving task, such a 137
trade-off has clear boundaries and represents a causal system (Rasmussen, 1985) . The introduction of 138 automation makes the driving task and the system more complex with blurred boundaries and no 139 simple relationship between function and physical processes making it difficult to represent them as a 140 causal system. Such systems are referred to as intentional systems. For intentional systems (ADAS 141 and AD systems), decision making requires knowledge about the system, its limitations and the actual 142 input to the system (from the environment) and a top-down approach to control the system in a safe 143 manner (Rasmussen, 1985 health, current state of the automation, near-future intentions of the automation). With the help 156 of real-time information about the automated system health, drivers can be brought back "in-157 to-the-loop" (Louw and Merat, 2017), as it helps increase their awareness (Banks and Stanton, 158 2016) and increase transparency in the cooperation between humans and automation (Eriksson 159 and (Rasmussen, 1985) , to demonstrate their knowledge-based behaviour due to unfamiliar 183 nature of the situations (Rasmussen, 1983) . The significance of the abstraction hierarchies can be 184 further illustrated by the fact that causes of failures or incorrect function are explained by a bottom-up 185 approach whereas the reasons for the proper function are explained by a top-down approach 186 (Rasmussen, 1985) . 187
Qualitatively, knowledge can potentially be classified into: 1) signals 2) signs and 3) symbols 188 (Rasmussen, 1983) . Signals which display time-space sensory data, help the drivers demonstrate skill-189 based behaviour (based on intuition and experience). While signs indicate towards a stored rule, they 190 do not provide the ability for drivers to process the situation in case a stored rule does not exist in 191 their mental model. Symbols on the other hand represent the relationship between signs and provide 192 the ability for drivers to demonstrate their knowledge-based behaviour and process the information to 193 create a new rule (by shifting the processing to a higher or a lower level of abstraction). 194 1.1.4. Creation of knowledge: identifying failures 195
While, as described above, providing knowledge to the drivers has a potential of increasing trust, it 196 needs to be stressed that the accuracy of the knowledge provided is key. Inaccurate knowledge plays a 197 detrimental role in development of trust as it takes additional cognitive effort on the part of drivers to 198 re-calibrate their mental model (initially formed in accordance to the inaccurate knowledge) to the 199 true capabilities of the system as they experience the system (Beggiato and Krems, 2013) . 200
In order to create the knowledge of the true capabilities and functionality of the automated system 201 (i.e., to identify failures), it is essential to conduct a thorough verification and validation process. 202
Moreover, due to the safety critical nature of ADAS and AD systems, their deployment needs to be 203 preceded by extensive testing to establish their safety level and performance boundaries (Sepulcre, 204 Gozalvez and Hernandez, 2013). As discussed in section 1. Kim, 2016). While the authors consider knowledge creation as an important part of the process of 211 development of trust, it remains out of scope of this paper and will be discussed in future publications. 212
While defining trust in section 1.1, the authors mentioned that trust is a history dependent construct, 213
suggesting its dynamic nature. The authors adopt the definition of calibration of trust as "the process 214
of adjusting trust to correspond to an objective measure of trustworthiness" (Muir, 1994) . Khastgir et 215 al. (2017a) introduced five stages of calibration of trust: initial phase (stage 1), loss phase (stage 2), 216 distrust phase (stage 3) and recovery phase (stage 4 and stage 5). There can be various intervention 217 methods to potentially increase/adjust trust in different stages of calibration. In this paper, the authors 218 discuss the use of static knowledge as an intervention method in the process of calibration of trust. 219
Research Question 220
As discussed in section 1.1, many authors have studied the effect of reliability (or automation 221 capability) on trust (Muir, 1994 ; Muir and Moray, 1996; Chavaillaz, Wastell and Sauer, 2016), 222
suggesting that with increased reliability, trust increases. However, there is no published research on 223 the effect of static knowledge of automation capability on trust in a driving context (both "trust in the 224 system" and "trust with the system"). With the help of a driving simulator study, this paper aims to 225 answer the following two research questions: 226 1. Does providing static knowledge about the automation capability of the system influence 227
"trust in the system"? 228 2. With static knowledge about the automation capability, does automation capability influence 229 "trust in the system"? 230
The authors hypothesize that static knowledge influences "trust in the system" as it would help 232
influence drivers' mental model and aid in them exercising their knowledge-based behaviour in 233 unfamiliar situations. Furthermore, the authors believe that static knowledge would have limited 234 effect on drivers' "trust with the system" as drivers' lack information about the automation health and 235 its intentions. While static knowledge does provide an ability for drivers to predict failures, it does not 236 help them understand the real-time tactical and operational driving task choices made by the 237 automated system. 238
This paper is organized in five sections. Section two discusses the methodology adopted for the study, 239 section three illustrates the results of the study, section four provides a discussion on the results and 240 the paper concludes with a conclusion in section five. 241 Out of the 56 participants who took part in the study, eight participants were not able to complete the 266 study due to simulator sickness and technical issues while running the driving simulator. The 48 267
Methodology
participants who completed the study were assigned to three groups (see Table 1 ). 268 The experiment was designed as a 2 x 2 mixed factorial design with automation capability as the 271 between-subject factor, and knowledge of the automation capability as a within-subject factor. For the 272 control group, automation capability was used as a within-in subject factor to evaluate whether trust 273 increased with experience without providing any knowledge to the driver (participant) about the 274 automation capability. As a part of the study, each participant was driven in automated mode (SAE 275 Level 4 as per SAE J3016 (SAE, 2018)) twice and witnessed five hazardous incidents during each 276 complete run. Since the study was evaluating SAE Level 4 automation, participants were asked to sit 277 in the front passenger's seat and hold the emergency stop button in their hands. Such an arrangement 278 also ensured that the participants could only use the button (instead of brake pedal) to stop the vehicle. 279
They were further informed that when the emergency stop button was pressed, the vehicle will apply 280 emergency brakes and will need to cover the braking distance depending on the speed of the vehicle. 281
In cases where the participant met with a simulated accident, the run ended abruptly. The driving 282 simulator route for the experiment involved a drive around the University of Warwick campus. Each 283 complete run lasted around 10 minutes. The route around University of Warwick was chosen to 284 provide a better immersive environment for the participants as most of them were familiar with the 285 university campus. Additionally, the University of Warwick route in the 3xD simulator has photo-286 realistic imagery and realistic road feedback (vibration) due to a LiDAR scan input which forms the 287 base for the simulation environment. The speed of the automated vehicle was according to the speed 288 limits set on the campus map, ranging from 10-30 miles per hour. 289
In order to overcome the lack of real-world consequences often experienced by simulation 290 participants, who can easily choose not to react as they might if their own life were in jeopardy (as in 291 real-world), the study had a gamification aspect to it. The game gave participants a goal during the 292 experiment run and added an element of risk to the study (Table 2) . Both these factors have been 293 discussed in section 1.1 as being essential to evaluate development of trust. Participants were awarded 294 1 point for every second they spent in automated mode. Every time they pressed the button, the button 295 press was classified as a "correct stop" or an "incorrect stop". For every correct stop they were 296 awarded a bonus of 200 points and for every incorrect stop, a penalty of 200 points. Before the run, 297 they were further provided information about what defined a correct and an incorrect stop. A correct 298
stop was one where the participant correctly identified that the automated system wouldn't be able to 299 handle the situation, prompting the participant to intervene and press the emergency stop button. An 300 incorrect stop was one in which the participant pressed the emergency stop button and brought the 301 vehicle to standstill, even though the automated system was capable of handling the situation. 302
Additionally, in case any participant crashed (met an accident), a penalty of 10000 points was given 303 and the experiment run came to an end. 304
An extremely high penalty was added for a crash to add a high degree of risk and motivate 305 participants to avoid crashing the vehicle as perceived risk influences driver's interaction with the 306 automated system (Eriksson, Banks and Stanton, 2017) . The penalties were added to get the 307 participants to react in a similar manner as if they were in real danger. The participants were asked to 308 maximise their score. However, the score was not a variable within the study. It was more of a 309 mechanism to encourage engagement in the task. Participants were provided information about their 310 score after the study was completed. Participants were given two objectives: 1) avoid crashing the 311 vehicle by pressing the button (emergency stop) 2) maximize time spent in automated mode. They 312
were asked to press the button only if they felt that the automated system couldn't handle the situation 313 or if they felt unsure about the automated system's performance. 314 In order to choose the five hazardous events, a hazard analysis of an automated vehicle was conducted 318
as per the ISO 26262 (ISO, 2011) functional safety process. Five different automated vehicle 319 functions were identified and a hazard was identified for each of the functions (Table 3) . For each 320 hazard, a hazardous event was identified which was created in each of the driving scenarios in the 321 experiment runs in the 3xD simulator. The hazard and hazardous event identification was done by 322 independent safety experts. One of the factors influencing the selection of the hazardous events was 323 the ability to create the events in the 3xD simulator. 324 Ego vehicle joins a roundabout while another vehicle is still in the roundabout and has right of way.
Object Detection
Compromised detection due to environmental factors
In foggy/rainy weather, ego vehicle is not able to detect traffic lights within the specified range. 326
Automation Capability 327
Two levels of automation capability were used in the study: 1) low capability automation 2) high 328 capability automation. The difference between the two systems was based on the ability of the 329 automated system to tackle the five hazardous events mentioned in section 2.3.1. Low capability 330
automated system was able to handle one out of the five hazardous events, requiring the driver to 331 intervene in four hazardous events to ensure safe performance of the vehicle. High capability 332 automated system was able to handle four out of the five hazardous events, requiring the driver to 333 intervene in only one hazardous event situation to ensure safe performance. 334 2.4. Procedure
335
When participants arrived for the experiment, they were initially briefed about the experiment 336 following which informed consent was taken from each participant and they were asked to fill in a 337 demographic questionnaire. Before the start of the study runs, each participant was given a trial run 338
(on a route different from the one used for the study runs) on the driving simulator with a researcher 339 seated next to the participant, to familiarize the participant with the visuals, motion feedback, 340 experience of sitting inside a car within a simulator and using the button to apply emergency brake on 341 the vehicle. Participants were told that they can ask for as many trial runs as they wish, in order to 342 make them comfortable with the simulator environment. Each trial run was of five minutes in length. 343
While most of the participants requested only one trial run, some participants requested for an 344 additional (second) trial run. After the trial runs, participants were asked whether they would like to 345 continue the study. In the case that the participant agreed, each participant experienced two 346 experiment runs of around 10 minutes each. Before the second run (for group 1 and group 2), 347
participants were provided knowledge about the capabilities of the automated system. Commentary 348 was read out to them via a prepared script. Effort was put into the preparation of the script in order to 349 avoid introducing any experiment bias. The script was reviewed by three independent human factors 350 experts. 351
For the control group, participants were told that in the two runs, they will experience automated 352 control systems from two different suppliers. No other information about system capabilities was 353
given. However, before the second run, it was reiterated that the participants will now experience a 354 different Knowledge was imparted to the participants via a prepared script which included illustrations 365 regarding the automated systems' capability and limitations. Special care was taken to ensure that 366 participant's mental model was informed so that they understood the functioning of the system in a 367 lay-man language to ensure higher level system understanding. This was particularly important in 368 order to ensure they were imparted with knowledge-based behaviour, as compared to rule-based or 369
skill-based behaviour. The knowledge imparted would enable them to deal with the unfamiliar 370 situation by transferring the cognitive task to a higher level or a lower level of abstraction in search of 371 an existing rule or intuition of their mental model (Rasmussen, 1985) . In the automated driving 372 context, the significance of knowledge-based behaviour is further emphasized as it helps a driver 373 adopt a means-end approach to execute the appropriate human intervention needed for the task. The 374
following two scripts are examples of the how knowledge was imparted to the participants. 375
Example 1: "The automated control system from the supplier is based on camera based sensors and 376 each automated control system will be trialled in separate runs in the sim. However, due to cost 377 pressures, they have chosen a single low quality camera with reduced field of view. 378
Vision based systems are dependent on the quality of the camera used. Due to cost pressures, the 379 supplier has compromised with the accuracy of the camera used for the vehicle. In this vehicle, a 380 lower grade camera has been used. Lower grade cameras are vulnerable to environmental factors 381 and image recognition degrades with lower visibility. E.g., certain cameras find it hard to detect 382 objects in rain, snow or fog or at certain times of the day due to image washout (Figure 1) to take caution. An example of this might be that as a driver, we know that if a pedestrian is standing 396
next to a zebra crossing, they have the right of way (Figure 2) . However, for a camera system, he/she 397 will only be a pedestrian with unknown intention. In this example the automated control system 398 wouldn't know the rules of the road and will not have the understanding of the priorities. 399
Another rule of the road that we as drivers are used to is the priorities at roundabouts and junctions 400 (Figure 2) . Imagine a person is given a driving license when he/she doesn't know the rules of the 401 road. Not only its dangerous for him/her, it is hazardous for the traffic around." 402 403 404 In the above examples, effort was made to differentiate between knowledge and rule-based 405 behaviours. Simple rules are comparatively easy to convey to participants, for Figure 1 , a rule would 406 be 'automated system will not work in fog'. However, there is no understanding why it will not work 407 (e.g. image recognition degrades with lower visibility which was provided as a part of the script). 408
Knowledge about other similar situation where the camera may not work was also provided via the 409 script (…hard to detect objects in rain, snow or fog or at certain times of the day); (You have the 410 luxury of using sunglasses, wipers etc. However, Camera doesn't have that. It has been found that 411 light colour objects against a bright sky is difficult to detect. This was the case in the recent Tesla 412
Model S crash where the white rear end of the truck was not detected against the bright sky). By 413 trying to impart knowledge the participant can envisage their own varied and numerous situations 414 where the automated system might act unexpectedly. 415
Trust questionnaire 416
At the end of each of the two experiment runs, participants were asked to rate their level of "trust in 417
the system" and "trust with the system". A subjective rating scale was used and participants were 418 asked to draw a line across a 100 mm box to indicate their level of trust (c.f. (Muir and Moray, 1996; 419 Rajaonah, Anceaux and Vienne, 2006)). Before being asked to rate different trust levels, participants 420
were briefed about the difference in the different types of trust via a prepared script which included 421 examples (was read to the participants as well as given in text form) to highlight the difference 422
between "trust in the system" and "trust with the system". Existing rating scales like Jian's scale 423 (Jian, Bisantz and Drury, 2000) , couldn't be used as they don't classify trust into the two components 424 mentioned in section 1.1. In order to explain the two different concepts of trust, participants were 425 briefed using an example of a mobile phone and call service provider. The following text was used for 426 the explanation: 427 "Trust in the system means that you have trust in the capabilities of the system and in its ability to do 428
what it is supposed to do as advertised to you. In other words, it does what it says on the box. Trust with 429
the system means that you are aware of the limitations of the systems and you adapt your use of the 430 system to accommodate for the limitations in order to get maximum benefit from the system. 431
For example, if you buy a mobile phone, you have trust in the systems about its advertised 432
capabilities. You develop trust with the system once you start using it and understand its limitations. 433
Ability to work with limitations guides your trust with the system. For the mobile phone and the call 434 service provider you have, you get call drop-outs in certain part of our house and not in another part 435 of your house. You would adapt your usage of the mobile phone by making calls only when you are in 436 a part of the house where you know call connection service is good. This is an example of you 437
acknowledging the limitations of the system, adapting your usage and developing trust with the 438 system" 439
On the trust scale, a 0% rating suggested very low trust and 100% suggested very high trust. As trust 440 is a continuum, any value in between 0 -100 suggests that the participant had partial trust. 441 The average "trust in the system" for low capability automation increased substantially from 32.4% to 444 65.4 %, with the introduction of knowledge about the system capabilities and limitations (Figure 3) . 445
Results
While an increase in "trust in the system" rating with the introduction of knowledge was seen for high 446 capability automation from 54.2% to 70.5% also, the effect was comparatively lower. It is interesting 447 to note that with the introduction of knowledge about the automated system's capabilities and 448 limitations, both median and mean values for "trust in the system" for low-capability and high-449
capability automated system were similar (Figure 3 ). In the low capability automation group, barring 450 two participants out of the 21 participants, all participants showed an increase in trust in the system 451 with the introduction of knowledge (Figure 4 ). High capability automation group also showed a 452 similar trend. The box-plots for trust in the system illustrate a higher convergence in trust ratings with 453 the introduction of knowledge, potentially due to appropriate calibration of trust level (Figure 3) . 454 A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted for the "trust in the system" and "trust with the 455 system" ratings with automation capability as the between factor variable and knowledge as the 456 within factor variable. The introduction of knowledge about the automation capabilities and 457 limitations had a highly significant statistical effect on the level of "trust in the system", F (1, 31) = 458 33.712, p = 0.000002 with a ηp 2 = 0.521, suggesting 52.1% of the variance being associated with the 459 introduction of knowledge. The introduction of knowledge didn't have an interaction effect with 460 automation capability, F (1, 31) = 3.846, p = 0.059 (ηp 2 = 0.11). Therefore, there was no effect of 461 automation capability on trust in the system ratings when knowledge was introduced. 462
While the average "trust with the system" changed with the introduction of knowledge ( Figure 5 ), the 463 effect was statistically insignificant, F (1, 31) = 3.652, p = 0.065 with a ηp 2 = 0.105. There was no 464
interaction effect between knowledge and automation capability for trust with the system ratings, F (1, 465 31) = 0.742, p = 0.396 (ηp 2 = 0.023). 466
In order to negate the effect of experience on trust ratings, a repeated measures ANOVA was 467 performed on the control group. The effect of the runs was statistically highly insignificant on the 468 level of "trust in the system", F (1, 13) = 0.105, p = 0.751 with a ηp 2 = 0.008. There were no 469 interaction effects between the runs and the two control groups, F (1, 13) = 0.020, p = 0.89 (ηp 2 = 470 0.002). 
False presses 477
While the introduction of knowledge about system capabilities and limitations increased trust in the 478 system for both low and high capability automation, it had contrasting effect in the two groups in 479 terms of number of false presses. The authors define a false press as a button press in a situation 480 which could be handled by the automated system, indicating distrust in the system. 481
For low capability automation, the average number of false presses increased significantly from 0.47 482 to 2.67 with the introduction of knowledge. On the contrary, for high capability automation the 483 average number of false presses decreased from 1.73 to 1.36 with the introduction of knowledge 484
( Figure 6 ). The outlier data from the box-plot were removed for mean calculation. This meant one 485 data point each from the two runs for high capability automation was removed. There were no outliers 486 in the data set for low capability automation group. 487
A paired-sample t-Test was conducted to assess the significance in the number of false presses with 488 the introduction of knowledge. For low capability automation, there was a statistically significant 489 difference in the number of False Presses for without knowledge run (M = 0.47, SD = 0.60) and 490 knowledge run (M = 2.67, SD = 1.65); t (20) = -6.398, p = 0.000003. For high capability automation, 491 the number of False Presses (FP) for without knowledge run (M = 2.41, SD = 2.79) and knowledge 492 run (M = 1.67, SD = 1.43) was statistically insignificant; t (11) = 0.792, p = 0.445. 493
As discussed in section 2.4.1, for the low capability automation group, participants were given a lot of 494 knowledge based on the automated systems' limited capability. One of the potential reasons for the 495 contrasting results between the two groups could be the amount of knowledge provided in the low 496 capability automation group and the participants' ability to process all the knowledge, develop 497 accurate mental model and display knowledge-based behaviour. However, higher trust ratings with 498
introduction of knowledge suggest that knowledge-based behaviour was displayed. Another potential 499 reason for the contradictory results could be the lack of dynamic (real-time) knowledge provided to 500 the participants (discussed in section 4). rules. Introduction of knowledge about the automated system capability had similar effect on the 507 average number of accidents for both the automation groups. For low capability automation, the 508 average number of accidents reduced significantly from 1 to 0.38 with the introduction of knowledge 509 (Figure 7) . For high capability automation, the average number of accidents reduced slightly from 510 0.58 to 0.42 (Figure 7) . It is interesting to note that most of the accidents were caused to due to late 511
interventions rather than absence of interventions. This may be explained due to lack of accurate 512 situation awareness about scenario handling capabilities of the automated system during the 513 automated driving scenario which could potentially be due to the lack of dynamic knowledge of the 514 participants. A paired sample t-Test was conducted to assess the statistical significance in the number 515 of accidents with the introduction of knowledge. There was a statistically significant difference in the 516 Similar to the false presses, the number of accidents for without knowledge (M = 0.5, SD = .52) and 519 with knowledge runs (M = 0.42, SD = 0.51) conditions for high capability automation was 520 insignificant; t (11) = 0.321, p = 0.754. 521 522 523
Discussion
524
As mentioned in section 1.1.1, "trust in the system" refers to the capability of the system where as 525 "trust with the system" refers to the ability of the driver to work with the system. In the study 526
presented, the authors have illustrated that with the introduction of knowledge about the system 527 capabilities and limitations, "trust in the system" increases, to similar trust ratings for low-capability 528 and high-capability systems. These results differ from the study in (Helldin et al., 2013) and (Hergeth, 529 Lorenz and Krems, 2017). While these studies did provide some feedback about the system 530 boundaries to the drivers, they were unable to instil knowledge-based behaviour as they didn't 531 mention how the system works due to which the driver's higher level mental model could not be 532 made. 533
It is worth noting that the effect of knowledge on "trust in the system" had a statistically highly 534 significant relationship (p = 0.000002), the effect of knowledge on "trust with the system" was 535 statistically not significant (p = 0.065). This can be explained by analysing the nature of knowledge 536 provided to the participants. As mentioned in section 1.1.2, knowledge can be qualitatively classified 537 into three categories. In the study presented, participants were provided with only static knowledge 538 about the capabilities and limitations of the systems. While this allowed them to demonstrate their 539 knowledge-based behaviour and helped them calibrate their trust in the system, the lack of system 540 feedback on the real-time state and intention of the system, led to lower levels of trust with the 541 system. This inference is further corroborated by the qualitative feedback from participants who were 542 asked to explain their rating of trust in their own words. One of the participants (participant #20) 543
commented: "warnings from the car missing" while other (participant # 40) commented "no 544
warnings & notification". Another participant (participant #37) mentioned: "I was able to 545 accommodate for the system but it was discomforting… near misses and close calls". 546 In other words, the introduction of static knowledge provided participants the capability to 547 demonstrate top-down understanding as per the abstraction hierarchy levels. However, with the 548 absence of dynamic knowledge, they were unable to get feedback (signs and signals) on the causes of 549 the failure, subsequently their reasoning capability was limited. Thus, in order to be able to work with 550 the system, i.e. accommodate for the limitations of the system and display their knowledge-based 551 behaviour appropriately, participants also require real-time knowledge (e.g. signals and signs) to 552 move the decision task to a higher or a lower abstraction level in search of pre-existing rules or 553
intuition, similar to a co-pilot in the aviation domain . Thus, the authors 554
suggest that "trust with the system" is potentially influenced to a larger extent by dynamic (real-time) 555 knowledge about the system capabilities and limitation. 556
The introduction of knowledge didn't have an interaction effect with automation capability on trust 557 ratings (p = 0.059 for "trust in the system" and p = 0.065 for "trust with the system" ratings). Thus 558
suggesting that similar levels of trust can be achieved if knowledge about the true capabilities and 559 limitations of the systems is provided to the driver. 560
While due to the study design the control group's trust ratings can't be compared with the low-561 capability automation or high-capability automation group's trust ratings, they do provide more 562 confidence in the results obtained in the two latter groups. The role of the control group was to either 563 support or negate the hypothesis that any change in trust ratings could be a result of experience. 564
Results showed that automation capability has no interaction effect on experience of the system (p = 565 0.89), thus negating the hypothesis. 566
Informed Safety 567
Results from this study could infer that vehicle manufacturers may choose to introduce low-capability 568 systems and provide knowledge in order to deliver increased user trust and overall system 569 performance. However, there is a caveat to this inference. For low capability automation, while 570 introduction of knowledge increased the level of trust in the system significantly (from 32.4% to 571 65.4%), it also increased the number of false presses significantly (from 0.476 to 2.67). Therefore, 572 very low capability and too much knowledge is also not an appropriate solution. The authors believe 573 that there is an optimum level of system capability and knowledge to be imparted at which trust could 574 be maximized and false presses could be minimized. Therefore, manufacturers may decide to enhance 575 automation capability by providing knowledge. Until systems are fully (100%) capable, augmenting 576 system capability with knowledge about the system's true capabilities, could be a method to bridge 577 the gap in trust. In other words, while manufacturers should aim to introduce high capability systems 578 in the market, the gap in system capability (system limitations) should be provided as knowledge to 579 the customers to ensure high trust in the system. 580
It is important to appreciate the difference in the manner in which non-specialists (i.e. general public) 581 would understand / interpret the knowledge imparted to them. As creators of the system, designers 582 and engineers have an appreciation and inclination towards technical understanding and the technical 583 feature explanation. Therefore, in this study care was taken in the language used in the script used to 584 impart knowledge to the participants. Use of technical jargon terms was avoided and illustrations were 585
used as examples to help participants visualize the system. In real life, it is important that 586 manufacturers explain the system capabilities and limitations in a non-technical manner in order to aid 587 customer's understanding by providing examples and ensuring the people read the provided 588 information. 589
This paper introduces the concept of "informed safety", as a means to calibrate trust to the appropriate 590 levels, which may include increasing those with low trust in capabilities or even reducing trust in 591 those with too much confidence in what the system can achieve by making them aware of system 592 boundaries. Informed safety means informing the driver (via static and/or dynamic knowledge) about 593 the safety limits of the automated system and its intention. Informed safety provides the ability to 594 display knowledge-based behaviour to shift the interpretation of a scenario to higher abstraction level 595 or a lower abstraction level (Rasmussen, 1983) . Informed safety aids the driver to interpret an 596 unexpected situation to adopt an appropriate tactical or strategic manoeuvre to handle the situation 597 safely. Informed safety is not just about providing rules of usage, it includes the background 598 information, understanding and knowledge about how the system operates. 599
Future research 600
It is a well-known fact that users don't read manuals and that vehicle dealers/Original Equipment 601
Manufacturers (OEMs) rarely do a good job in sufficiently or appropriately informing customers 602
about the system capabilities and limitations (Beggiato and Krems, 2013; Eichelberger and McCartt, 603 2014; Larsson, Kircher and Hultgren, 2014). As automated systems are introduced, innovative 604 methods of informing the driver (customer) to create an "informed safety" level, need to be 605 implemented. One potential solution could be providing a virtual tour of the vehicle at the dealership, 606 which gives the customers an immersive experience of the various features and can help them 607 calibrate their mental models and their expectations from the vehicle. Other means of providing 608
"informed safety" may be short videos on the working of the Human Machine Interface (HMI) or 609 specifically designed voice assistant features. All the discussed methods may form a part of the initial 610
showroom briefing or a pre-sale briefing. However, these methods need to be evaluated to measure 611 their effectiveness. 612
Study limitations 613
The WMG's 3xD simulator provides a fully immersive driving experience for participants. However, 614 like all simulator studies, transferability of results to real world needs to be evaluated separately. Real-615 world evaluation of trust remains out of the scope of this paper. Additionally, as discussed in section 616 4.1, informed safety, as introduced in this paper, has two facets: 1) static knowledge (e.g. initial 617
briefing and driving manual) and 2) dynamic knowledge such as human-machine interface. In this 618 paper, the authors only provided static informed safety to drivers. Future studies are planned where 619 participants will be provided both dynamic knowledge and static knowledge. Results will be 620 published in future publications. 621
Conclusion
622
Trust in automated systems is one of the key factors that would help realize the potential benefits 623 offered by the introduction of automation in vehicles. However, trust level needs to be calibrated to 624 the appropriate level in order to reap the benefits of the automated systems in a safe manner by 625 preventing misuse or disuse. This study explores the effect of knowledge about the automation 626 capability on trust in the system. 627
In this paper, the authors demonstrate via a 56 participants driving simulator study that "trust in the 628 system" increases with the introduction of static knowledge about the capabilities and limitation of the 629 automated system. With the introduction of static knowledge, trust in the system for both low 630 capability automation and high capability automation were not significantly different, 65.4% and 631 70.5% respectively, suggesting no influence of automation capability on trust in the system when 632
knowledge is provided to the drivers. Based on results, the authors introduced the concept of 633 "informed safety" which helps calibrate drivers' trust to an appropriate level, subsequently ensuring 634 safe use of the automated system. 635 Interestingly, with the introduction of static knowledge the average number of false presses had 636
contrasting results for the two automation groups. With the introduction of knowledge, for the high 637 capability automation group, the average number of false presses decreased from 1.73 to 1.36, while it 638 increased from 0.47 to 2.67 for the low capability automation group. However, average number of 639 accidents decreased from 1 to 0.38 and from 0.58 to 0.42 for low capability automation and high 640 capability automation respectively. The improved safety with the introduction knowledge lends its 641 support to the concept of informed safety. In order to reduce the number of false presses, the authors 642 hypothesize the need to provide "informed safety" in a dynamic manner, i.e., via knowledge about the 643 automation state and health through the HMI system. Results on the study exploring the hypothesis 644 will be presented in future publications. 645
